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Summary
The intensive use of natural resources in theMaghreb, in particular by the agricultural 
sector, is creating an urgent need to design
governance mechanisms at both the local 
and national level. Groundwater has become 
one of the most fragile of these resources. 
The rapid development of groundwater use for
irrigation in the Maghreb has resulted in significant
agricultural growth, but in many regions, 
such development has become unsustainable
because of aquifer overexploitation or water and
soil salinization. Adequate instruments to address
this unsustainable use are not easy to design
and implement, for there are many informal
groundwater withdrawals by farmers, and water
resource management organizations have limited
intervention capacity. The paper examines
groundwater use and management in Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia based on a study of national
institutional and policy mechanisms and nine (9)
local case studies. Overexploitation creates
environmental, economic and social risks, and
there are already significant identifiable impacts
in several of the case studies. Farmers address
the problem of decreasing borehole flow-rates
(or water salinization) either by constantly
investing more in order to continue to have
sufficient quantities of fresh water for their crops,
or by adjusting their cropping systems to adapt
to this decrease. In the absence of specific
policies, there are increasing differences between
those farms that have the resources to continue
investing more in order to have sufficient water,
and those that have to adapt their crops to 
the shortage. Legal frameworks have laid
management foundations, but they only have a
limited impact, in particular, because of the
generally informal nature of such uses.  Different
strategies are currently being discussed at
national level, and are often focused on
contractual approaches with the farmers.
Concomitantly, some collective initiatives have
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Program Coordinator, ORNA) with support from Paula Mejia (Consultant, ORNA). Overall guidance was received from Jacob
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been conceived at local level. The range of policies implemented to
address this unsustainable use is very broad-based, and entails both
increased water resources and the adoption of instruments to limit
increases in withdrawals. These instruments are based on control and
incentive mechanisms.  In the cases considered, jointly used instruments
have made it possible to limit increases in withdrawals and to facilitate
water enhancement, without, however, restoring the resource-use
balance. The design and implementation of strategies for sustainable
aquifer exploitation require the building of coalitions of actors, which
should include organizations responsible for water resources, those
involved in agriculture, but also - and especially - farmers. Support could
be provided to the formation of such coalitions and to their reflections
on possible options to assist an agricultural economy based on
sustainable aquifer use.
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 1.   Introduction
The growth of the agricultural sector in the Maghreb has increased the pressure on natural resources such as water, soil
and forests. Innovative governance mechanisms will be required to
address the overexploitation of these resources. These governance 
mechanisms are increasingly less frequently designed and coordinated
at the national level alone, but have become more focused on
the local level. Groundwater is one of the resources that has 
been made fragile as a result of agricultural development. Indeed, 
for about sixty years, the dissemination of borehole drilling and 
pumping methods has led to the rapid development of ground 
water use for irrigation in the Maghreb. These countries have be-
come one of the world’s main regions for the intensive use of
groundwater for agriculture (Siebert, 2010). This revolution, ‘silent’ -
because it is often carried out informally by farmers outside the
scope of public policies (Llamas, 2008) - has created significant 
agricultural growth. 
However, such development has created extremely strong pressure
on water resources. In North Africa, the renewable groundwater 
resource mobilization rate (withdrawal-to-recharge ratio) is high (Bzioui,
2005). The average groundwater exploitation rate in Northern Algeria
is 80%. The estimated number of aquifers in Tunisia is 273, 71 of
which are overexploited at an average rate of 146% (TICET, 2009). Over-
exploitation has also been noted for most of the large aquifers in North
Africa, such as the Souss, Tadla, Berrechid and Saïss aquifers in 
Morocco, those of Bas-Cheliff, on the Mascara Plain and Mostaganem
Plateau in Algeria, and the Sisseb el Alem aquifer in Tunisia (Bahir and
Mennani, 2002; Boudjadja et al., 2003; Loucif, 2003). These imbalances
will become more pronounced in the future according to climate change
model predictions.  In addition to the predicted rise in temperatures,
which will create higher evapotranspiration, rainfall in the Mediterranean
area is expected to decrease (Christensen et al., 2007). This could 
reduce aquifer recharge and increase farmers’ use of these aquifers
to compensate for the widening imbalance between evapotranspiration
and precipitation.
In an increasing number of regions, such agricultural development 
becomes unsustainable due to aquifer overexploitation but also soil
salinization, when groundwater is or becomes salty. The impacts of 
this unsustainable exploitation are becoming visible in either soil 
salinization in Bas-Cheliff in Algeria or the sharp decline in irrigated
agriculture in coastal Chaouia in Morocco. Moreover, irrigation using
groundwater is often carried out in the case of intensive farming,
which is demanding in terms of inputs and creates a risk of ground-
water contamination by nitrogen fertilizers. 
Small family farms with limited capacity to drill deeper or to continue
their activity in other regions, are most vulnerable to such unsustainable
soil and water uses. In the absence of any management of this 
unsustainable use, the entire local agricultural economy has become
fragilized with cascade effects on rural development, agricultural 
sub-sectors and, ultimately, the food security of the countries 
concerned. 
In the countries where: (i) the organizations responsible for groundwater
resource management have significant financial and human 
resources; and (ii) groundwater users are officially registered with
these organizations, different approaches have been tested to tackle 
aquifer overexploitation. In these countries, the legislative framework 
and institutional resources have made it possible to design and
implement joint strategies to control farming practices in order to 
ensure the viability of such uses.  These approaches have often turned
to standard Integrated Water Resource Management instruments such
as pricing and quotas (Montginoul and Lenouvel, 2009). Such an 
approach is also enshrined in the European Water Framework Directive.
In France, in particular, this approach is implemented through ground-
water contracts or under Water Development and Management
schemes at aquifer level. This is the case on the Beauce Plain, where
every farmer has a multi-year quota (Petit, 2009). These approaches
are based on the capacity to control and measure users’ groundwater
withdrawals. Such contractual approaches have also been applied to
the diffused pollution of the aquifers (Barbier and Chia, 2001).
However, in many other countries, the two prerequisites of resource
management organizations’ capacity and official registration of users
are not met (Mukherji and Shah, 2005). While many community 
groundwater management systems exist in these countries, they 
usually only concern a limited number of small areas (van Steenbergen,
2006). In the Maghreb in particular, the large number of farmers using
groundwater, their informal use of it, and the weak management 
institutional mechanism make direct control of users difficult, at least in
the medium term.  Moreover, the design and implementation of strategies
to ensure the viability of the aquifer/soil system are not easy for several
reasons.  First, water resource and user impact dynamics are complex.
Second, there is no framework for consultation between irrigated 
agriculture and water resource management actors. Finally, in Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia, much of the land is farmed by tenant farmers who
use water and soil resources intensively and who leave the area to 
settle elsewhere once these resources have degraded, which could be
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qualified as ‘mining’ behavior. Therefore, alternative ways must be found,
both in terms of strategies and to ensure the participation of the 
different actors in designing these strategies. The aim of this paper is to
analyze the existing situation of groundwater overexploitation in 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia: farmers’ strategies, the potential risks 
incurred by this overexploitation, but also, and especially, the different
public and private initiatives taken to tackle it.  This analysis will identify
some areas of reflection to ensure the sustainable management of the
system formed by the aquifers and the farmers who depend on them. 
The case studies concern aquifers which are overexploited and where the
public authorities are trying to ensure the sustainability of the irrigated
aquifer-agriculture systems. The paper will briefly examine those aquifers
that the public authorities plan to exploit in a ‘mining’ manner without any
resource-use balance consideration. In particular, in Southern Algeria and
Tunisia, the governments have not pursued a conservation logic for the
aquifers of the Northern Sahara Aquifer System, but rather one of 
supporting their exploitation. In the case studies, the main focus will be
agricultural use, since this is by far the most important use (for example,
95% of the Souss aquifer withdrawals are for agriculture use), and also 
because the other uses are far more easily controlled.
The study is focused on several levels. On the one hand, national 
public policies are reviewed, including those already officially defined, or
even implemented, and ongoing discussions. Then, different local
cases studies were examined in order to assess the local impacts of 
unsustainable groundwater use. The case study selection criteria were
the existence of a high risk of unsustainable water table use and the 
objective of a diversity of situations. The case studies concern: the 
regions of Souss (Souss and Chtouka aquifers), Saïss, Berrchid and
coastal Chaouia in Morocco, regions of the Mostaganem Plateau, 
Bas-Cheliff and the central zone of Mitidja in Algeria, and the regions of
Nadhour and Ras Jebel in Tunisia (Fig. 1). The information presented is
either the result of the team’s earlier work, or was gathered from 
specific interviews with the national organizations, and in each case
study with local organizations and around ten farmers in each case.The
paper first presents groundwater use trends in the three countries, then
the individual (sometimes collective) strategies implemented by farmers
to address decreasing groundwater levels. Thereafter, it assesses the
risks incurred by unsustainable groundwater uses. The different local
and public policy initiatives implemented are analyzed, followed by a
few thoughts on how to achieve the sustainability of the systems
formed by the aquifers and their dependent irrigated agriculture.
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Figure 1 : Geographical Distribution of Case Studies
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2.   Agricultural Use of Groundwater
2.1  Resources of Significant Importance...
I n Tunisia, the number of surface wells doubled in 20 years, from60,000 in 1980 to 120,000 in 2000. This growth has also continued
over the past ten years (Ben Boubaker, 2010). Groundwater now
represents about 52% of the water used in Algeria, 44% in Tunisia
and 14% in Morocco (refer to Table 1). Falling borehole costs were
the main driver of this growth. It is worth noting that, in the three
countries, farmers mentioned that the sharp fall in borehole costs
was the result of the introduction of drilling machines of Syrian origin.
Other factors also played a role in this rapid growth of groundwater-
based irrigation. Thus, the decline in average farmed areas has
stepped up pressure to intensify cropping systems.  Moreover, in
Algeria, in the early 2000s, drought led to the urgent rechanneling of
dam water intended for agriculture to towns to make up for the shortfall
in drinking water. Many farmers whose dam water allocation was
reduced or cancelled then dug wells or drilled boreholes.
2.2  Yet Fragile
The main impact of overexploitation is decreasing aquifer levels. In
Morocco, the water table of the Saïss deep aquifer has fallen by an
annual average of 3 metres over the past 20 years. The water volume
stored within the Berrchid aquifer fell from 1500 million m3 in 1980 to
800 million m3 in 2009, according to the Bouregreg-Chaouia Basin
Agency. Dewatering has already been observed on the periphery of this
aquifer. The Bouregreg-Chaouia Basin Agency predicts that the aquifer
could be completely dewatered by 2025. Moreover, when the aquifer
is located in a coastal area, overexploitation may lead to saline infiltration
as in the case of the Chaouia coast in Morocco where, due to a sharp
rise in salinity, farmers have had to return to rain fed agriculture. This
salt-water wedge caused by groundwater overexploitation is also present
in many Algerian (Boudjadja et al., 2003) and Tunisian (Cap Bon coastal
area in North-Western Tunisia) coastal aquifers. 
Lastly, in North-Western Algeria and in many oasis regions of the
three countries, groundwater is naturally salty: its use in irrigation
creates a risk of soil salinization (Trabelsi et al., 2007; Gaaloul, 2008).
In the case of the Nefzawa area in Tunisia, salinization has risen as
a result of overexploitation (Zammouri et al, 2007). In the Cheliff valley
in Algeria, irrigation with salty groundwater has led to an increase in
secondary soil salinization which rose by 35% between the 1950s
and the 2000s (Douaoui et al., 2005). In the case of Bas-Cheliff,
ongoing sodification of soils is causing their gradual de-structuring
(Bouarfa et al., 2009). 
The main aquifer shared by the three countries is the Western Sahara
Aquifer System, which extends from Algeria to Tunisia and Libya; 2.2
billion cubic metres per year are abstracted from this aquifer - a
volume higher than the 1 billion cubic metre recharge (Bzioui, 2005).
Although stored volumes are very significant, the concentration of
abstraction points is creating a sharp drop in piezometric levels in
certain areas. The piezometric level has thus fallen by over 100 metres
in the Ghadames area (Horriche and Besbes, 2008) and led to the
disappearance of artesianism in many regions (Mamou et al., 2006).
There are also different common aquifers between Morocco and
Algeria, some of which are also overexploited, but less significant in
terms of size and economic importance (UNESCO, 2011).
Source : Agoussine and Bouchaou (2004); Bzioui (2005); Algerian Ministry of Water Resources (2011); Plan Bleu (2007)
Table 1 : Renewable Water Resources used in the Maghreb
Morocco Algeria Tunisia 
Mobilizable 
Resources
Resources Used
(all uses) 
Mobilizable 
Resources
Resources Used
(all resources)
Mobilizable 
Resources 
Resources Used
(all uses)
Total Volume
(Billion
m3/year)
23.0 19.2 18.9 6.4 4.8 2.4
Of which 
surface water
83% 86% 65% 48% 56% 22%
Of which
groundwater 
17% 14% 35% 52% 44% 78%
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3. Farmers’ Strategies to Address the
Impacts of Unsustainable Groundwater 
It is possible to distinguish between two groups of strategiesadopted by farms to address the impacts of the above-described
unsustainable use of aquifers (Bekkar et al., 2009; Berrahmani et al.,
submitted). A first group consists of strategies that may be qualified
as ‘chasing strategies’. These strategies consist in investing in order
to obtain sufficient fresh water to maintain the farm’s production
system.  Where the aquifer is deep, farmers initially try out ‘vertical’
strategies by drilling deeper. This strategy requires investment
resources. It also often entails bypassing legal control mechanisms
for these boreholes. In Tunisia, farmers declare boreholes for domestic
or non-farm use in order to obtain a legal electricity connection, then
ask for it to be changed to the ‘agricultural use’ category, so as to
obtain a lower tariff. Where the aquifer is shallow and boreholes already
reach its substratum, farmers adopt ‘horizontal’ strategies’, by seeking
water further away (up to a few kilometres) and piping it back to the
farm.  In a few schemes in the Cap Bon region in Tunisia, faced with
water salinization, farmers mix groundwater with better quality - but
more expensive - public network water. Finally, when it becomes too
expensive to bring the required water to the cropping system in place,
the choice is often made (if the farmer has the resources), to move to
other areas where water is still accessible in order to continue with
the same cropping system, especially market gardening. 
The second group comprises strategies that may be qualified as
‘adaptive’, i.e. the farmers seek to adapt their cropping systems and
pathways to a drop in available water resources in terms of quality and/or
quantity (Hartani et al., 2009). In some cases, these adaptation strategies
may be collective.  In Souss, groups of farmers collectively manage
irrigation areas using groundwater. Faced with falling collective borehole
flow rates, some of these groups have collectively converted their irrigation
system to a localized irrigation system. For farmers pursuing this strategy,
when water becomes too scarce or salty, the final options are to return
to rain fed crops, and often to supplement  agricultural income with an
off-farm job, which could lead to migration towards the towns.
The key criterion for the selection of a particular strategy is access
to capital (Berrahmani et al., submitted). Moreover, farmers who are
able to find the necessary amounts to drill boreholes also often have
the necessary social networks for drilling despite administrative bans.
The decrease in groundwater levels thus implies greater differentiation
between farms, with direct consequences on the territory and rural
development.
In most of Tunisia (with the exception of the oasis areas), irrigation
schemes using groundwater are usually managed by farmer groups
known as Agricultural Development Groups (GDA). Farmers in some
GDAs have collectively defined a few adaptation strategies. For
instance, GDAs in the Nadhour region have stopped supplying water
to farms outside the scheme, or else, at the start of the year, limit
irrigated areas per farmer to reduce pressure on the water tower.
However, based on GDAs studied in this same region (Nadhour),
farmers are unable to coordinate themselves to diversify their produce
and irrigation dates and times. Specialization of all the farmers in the
same financially profitable irrigated crops causes water consumption
peaks, both during the year and day. 
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4.  Risks Incurred by Unsustainable
Groundwater Use  
4.1  Evolutions Related to Aquifers Depth
When aquifers are overexploited, the types of risks and speedwith which they appear, depend above all on the depth of
these aquifers. A first group of superficial aquifers that have substrata
less than 150m below ground level may be considered. Among the
cases studied, these are located in the Chaouia, Berrchid and Nadhour
regions as well as the Mostaganem Plateau. In these cases, farmers
often have to manage a rapid decrease in aquifer flow rates, especially
where aquifer productivity is weak (as in the case of the Nadhour
region). In the case of the Chaouia, Berrchid Nadhour regions, less than
30 years have lapsed between the beginning of the intensive use of
groundwater and the emergence of an agricultural crisis due to a
shortage of water. In the longer term, there is a dewatering risk and
for most farmers, a return to rain fed agriculture.
The second group corresponds to the deep aquifers such as Souss
and Saïss in Morocco, the Bas-Cheliff and Mitidja aquifers in Algeria
and those located to the west of Kairouan in the Merguellil Plain in
Tunisia. In these cases, decreasing groundwater levels initially lead to
an increase in drilling and pumping costs. Already, small farms in the
Souss and Saïss Plains no longer have the resources to drill individual
boreholes. The smallest farms that are unable to find another form of
supply (collective borehole, agreement with borehole owners, and supply
from surface water resources) will have to return to rain fed agriculture.
For these deep aquifers, the evolution dynamics are slower than for the
superficial aquifers: the risks might only appear in several years and
only concern, the next generations of farmers.    
4.2  Local Risks
Local economic development is affected by overexploitation when
farmers can no longer manage to maintain the chasing strategies without
moving, or are unable to define local adaptive strategies that will provide
them with sufficient income. In particular, the decrease of farm activities
leads to a downturn in all the other related economic activities,
especially upstream agricultural (inputs) and downstream (marketing). 
Coastal Chaouia in Morocco represents an example of the strong
impact of overexploitation on agricultural dynamics and the local
economy. Groundwater has been used intensively since the 1970s,
initially for citrus fruit production then for horticulture (mainly tomatoes
and potatoes) and fodder crops. Groundwater overexploitation has
caused the infiltration of sea water in coastal areas, and a drop in
piezometric levels more in the interior. Since the 1980s, farmers have
been compelled to adapt to the water shortage situation with actions
such as borehole deepening, bringing water to their farms from wells
sunk in other areas, or renting land upstream in the same area or in
other regions. In the coastal area, citrus fruit, which is highly sensitive
to salinization, has been replaced by market gardening, which itself
has decreased significantly in favour of more salt-resistant but less
profitable crops (such as cauliflowers or maize).  The shortage of high
quality groundwater was the key motivating factor in the area’s shift
from intensive, export-focused agriculture to the current situation of
crisis and fragile farms. The entire downstream agriculture sector has
been completely destabilized by this crisis: the number of cooperatives
involved in market gardening exports has fallen from 120 in the 1980s
to 3 today. Many farmers, both in the coastal area and in the interior,
are leaving every year in search of work in the towns and only cultivate
rain fed cereal crops on their plots.
4.3  National Level Risks
The ‘agricultural crisis’ as experienced by coastal Chaouia could lead to
an exodus of people in search of work. It is also leading to another type
of exodus: that of farmers who have the resources to invest and who will
continue their ‘chasing strategy’ in other areas, which could also lead to
greater pressure on groundwater resources in these other regions. 
Lastly, overexploitation will have an impact on the food security of the
three countries. However, there is no quantified estimate of this risk for
the Maghreb. Postel (1999) suggests an estimate of 10% of global
agricultural production based on groundwater overexploitation.
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5.  Institutional Frameworks and Local
Initiatives  
5.1  National Strategies Being Designed
Legal and Institutional Frameworks
The three countries have Water Laws that include specific clausesconcerning groundwater: the 1975 Water Code in Tunisia, the 2005
Water Act in Algeria and the 1995 Water Act in Morocco. All these codes
make provision for granting permits for groundwater exploitation,
systematically in Algeria, for boreholes deeper than 50m in Tunisia, and
for boreholes exceeding the locally defined thresholds in Morocco. The
water codes of the three countries provide for the establishment of
quantitative protection areas, where the drilling of new wells and
boreholes is either subject to authorization (protection areas in Tunisia
and in Morocco) or completely banned (protection areas in Algeria and
interdiction zone in Tunisia). 
The institutional mechanisms for groundwater management vary widely
from country to country. In Morocco, the basin agencies are the key
aquifer management actors under the oversight of the State Secretariat
for Water and Environment. They are responsible for groundwater
resource studies, the implementation of water resource development
policies as well as of control measures. In Tunisia, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Environment with its different national directorates and
regional administrations (especially the Regional Agricultural
Development Divisions) is responsible for the monitoring and control
of groundwater exploitation.   In particular, these organizations manage
an observation network concerning the country’s aquifers. They also
prepare the studies for the assessment and establishment of the
general inventory of these resources. In Algeria, the roles are much
more distinct. The National Water Resource Development Agency
(ANRH) is responsible for aquifer studies, the Basin Agencies are mainly
tasked with water user registration, and the Wilaya Water Directorates
(DHW) are responsible for water policing. 
These differences between the three countries have led to differences
in the design of management mechanisms.  In Morocco, it is the role
of the basin agency to organize consultations between the actors,
whereas in Tunisia, the issue is considered above all as an internal matter
for the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment.  In Algeria, the Ministry
of Water Resources organizes inter-institutional consultations between
basin agencies, ANRH and DHW. The actual activities carried out by
these organizations may vary from region to region. 
Integration between the administrations responsible for agricultural
development and those responsible for water resource protection is carried
out at both the local and national level to ensure public policy coordination.
At the national level, joint inter-ministerial working committees exist in
Algeria and Morocco to try to harmonize the respective policies. At local
level, discussions are held between the different administrations and the
actors (refer to examples below).  However, this integration is not easy as
is shown in Tunisia and Morocco by the concessioning of agricultural
public enterprise land to private entrepreneurs with a view to agricultural
intensification. This concessioning takes place with unseay integration of
the issue of the relevant groundwater resources to be used when defining
development plans.
Overall, the Moroccan basin agencies, the ANRH and DHW in Algeria, and
the Directorate-General of Water Resources at the Ministry of Agriculture
and Environment in Tunisia have a professional culture based on hydrological
and hydro-geological expertise. They attach great importance to data
acquisition and the operation of models that will facilitate the preparation
of water resource inventories. These organizations have less knowledge
of the agricultural sector and, in particular, have only limited information
on aquifer users. They also lack human resources for coordinating the
multi-actor consultation process.  These tasks are often assigned to private
consulting firms in Tunisia and Morocco for limited periods. 
Furthermore, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya have tasked the Sahara and Sahel
Observatory with coordinating the exploitation of the water of the North-
Western Sahara Aquifer SystemIn practice, the Observatory is mainly
responsible for conducting hydro-geological studies and communicating
the forecasts for borehole drilling projects in each country to the other
member countries. 
Innovative, but not yet Formalized National Approaches
In the three countries, various policies are under discussion to ensure
sustainable aquifer management. In Tunisia and in Morocco, a specific
groundwater management strategy is being designed. The main focus
of these strategies is on local contractual mechanisms, which would
lead to integration of the different policies, in particular those relating to
supply and demand management. 
Thus in Morocco, the Secretariat for Water and Environment has proposed
the introduction of groundwater contracts for the main overexploited
aquifers. These groundwater contracts, which have to be signed between
the different public administrations and user associations, should incorporate
all the measures to be taken in a particular area to protect water resources
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and their exploitation. Such contracts are envisaged or are being executed
for about ten aquifers. In 2011, the only groundwater contract signed has
been the Souss-Massa Aquifer Framework Agreement. 
In Tunisia, there is long-lasting reflection begun in the late 1990s (Water
Sector Study), on the opportunity for participatory groundwater
management. Since the 1990s, the Ministry of Agriculture’s general
policy has been to support the formation of groups of farmers, known
as GDAs, and which are called upon to become local partners in public
policy implementation. In keeping with this general approach, the aim
is to task the GDAs with groundwater management in their areas of
operation and in particular, borehole control. Currently, there is only one
case where such an approach has been initiated in practice (the Bsissi
GDA in the Gabès Governorate).
The proposed contractual approaches in Morocco and in Tunisia are
different.  The Moroccan approach has from the outset focused on large
aquifers, whereas the Tunisian approach will, a priori, apply more easily
to smaller-scale aquifers. In the case of Tunisia, while the local scale
makes good sense for the actors, the issue of selecting the appropriate
level for defining consultation among actors and determining public
policies on a broader scale (aquifer, watershed, even nationwide) is not
obvious due to the existence of significant inter-basin transfers.
5.2  Local Negotiations
In Morocco, Negotiations Centered Around the Basin Agency
In Morocco, initiatives to set up management mechanisms are often
taken at regional level (basin agency, regional council), with little
intervention from the national level, which, in particular, has not 
yet proposed a methodological framework for the preparation of
groundwater contracts. Horizontal cooperation is being set up: agencies
are exchanging information directly among themselves on how to
organize the impounding of drilling machines. The most striking local
example of this initiative is that of the Souss and Chtouka aquifers. In
2004, the Souss-Massa Regional Council launched a study to define
a regional development strategy. A key factor was agriculture, whose
Achilles heel was aquifer overexploitation. Indeed, from 2003,
overexploitation in the Guerdane sector had resulted in water table levels
over 300 metres below ground level and very low borehole productivity.
As a result, 11,900 hectares of orange groves in that region (Houdret,
2008) were abandoned. In 2005, the Souss-Massa Basin Agency
launched an initiative to control borehole drilling.  In 2006, 70 drilling
machines were impounded.  In the same year, at the initiative of the
regional council, a framework agreement was signed between this
council, the Agricultural Development Authority, the basin agency, the
Chambers of Agriculture, the Regional Water Users Federation and
three Agricultural Professional Organizations for the marketing of market
garden produce and citrus fruits. This agreement has four (4) thrusts:
(1) actions to reduce water consumption and increase water productivity,
in particular with support to reconversion from gravity and overhead
irrigation to localized irrigation, and the strengthening of water policing;
(2) research aimed at ensuring more efficient irrigation water use and
assessment of waste water reuse potential; (3) research on the use of
deep aquifers; and (4) construction of some small dams. Each thrust
was scheduled to be implemented by way of specific agreements. The
financing required to implement this framework agreement is estimated
at about 3.5 million Moroccan dirhams (about 310,000 euros). This
financing is planned to come from the contributions of farms of over 15
hectares. This category of farm does, in fact, comprise about 20% of
farms and 80% of water withdrawals. Even though this framework
agreement is not officially a groundwater contract, in practice, it plays
such a role. 
Implementation of this agreement mainly concerns the first thrust.
Coordination between the Souss-Massa agency, the Agricultural
Development Authority and the local branches of the Ministry of Interior
has led to the impounding of many illegal drilling machines. Controls
are carried out by employees of the agency and the development
authority, on the basis of calls from the local authorities or farmers.
Between 2006 and 2009, 120 machines were impounded.  In 2010,
none were impounded, which is considered by the Basin Agency as a
sign of the sharp decrease in illegal borehole activities. This experience
underscores the importance of building coalitions of actors. However,
regardless of the possibility that new illegal boreholes are still being
drilled, legal borehole drilling is continuing. Indeed, farmers may request
the replacement of a borehole which has dried up by a deeper one.
The other key component of this thrust is the shift towards localized
irrigation. In 2010, 16,000 hectares of the 30,000 ha to be equipped
over the 2008-2012 period were equipped for this method. The third
major initiative is the study of a 10,000 hectare irrigated area using
desalinated sea water in the Chtouka zone.
In contrast, in the Saïss zone in Morocco where the aquifer is deep 
and where falling groundwater levels have not yet had economic
consequences, the Basin Agency is struggling to convince the other
public organizations to limit withdrawals, and in particular not to issue
new permits. This difference of opinion is one of the major constraints
impeding the definition of a management contract for the Saïss aquifer. 
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Negotiations in Algeria outside Formal Frameworks
In two of the case studies in Algeria, negotiations brought the local
actors together, although they were not held in a formal context. In
2010, the Mostaganem Chamber of Agriculture took the initiative to
apply for authorization to drill new boreholes on the Mostaganem
Plateau the operationalization of the Mostaganem desalination plant
may enable to increase agricultural use of the aquifer. It proposed to
establish an order of priority for these authorizations by emphasizing
boreholes for livestock, potatoes and citrus fruit. This initiative was
backed by the DHW and the Mostaganem Wilaya Agricultural Services
Delegation, as well as three professional associations for the 3 sectors
concerned. The Prefecture finally decided to postpone the decision
to issue authorizations following the assessment of available resources
after the plant’s entry into service. This initiative is, however, an
innovative example of a local coalition involving government services
and farmer associations. Similarly in the central area of Mitidja, in
Chebli Region, recharge basins were constructed in 2004. These
basins have no longer been supplied since 2008 owing to the
construction of a diversion sill built to convey the water from the El
Harrach Wadi to the new Douira dam. Farmers mobilized themselves
to request the resumption of groundwater recharge operations (which
finally happened in April 2011) and also held discussions with the
public authorities on a future breakdown of water from the spring
upstream from the Wadi between the volume taken to supply the
dam and that intended for groundwater replenishment.
5.3  Farmers’ Points of View and Collective Initiatives
The main reason for interaction among farmers is the shared use of
boreholes. There are many forms of informal arrangements in Morocco
and Algeria among farmers to obtain such access. Although varied
(ranging from a solidarity grant to an agricultural production partnership)
(Boudjelal et al., 2011), they do not include the existence of groundwater
markets  as identified in India (Shah, 2009) where farmers without
groundwater access may directly contact several others who own
boreholes in order to purchase water.
Farmers’ points of view on the relevance and legitimacy of well and
borehole drilling controls vary greatly from one situation to another.
Controls carried out by the farmers themselves exist in some traditional
systems such as the khettara (underground drainage galleries) in
Morocco, where the communities ban boreholes in the khettara
catchment areas. However, such controls stem from the historically
grounded legitimacy of the communities to harvest and manage
groundwater for the farmers’ collective. In the other regions, farmers
questioned underscored the equal rights of all farmers to drill 
(Bento et al., 2009).
Outside these khettara areas, farmers consider that borehole control
falls above all within the remit of the State (Bekkar et al., 2009). However,
the willingness of farmers to subject themselves to such controls may
also differ from area to area. Thus, in Morocco, different surveys have
shown that half the farmers questioned from Souss and Saïss mention
such controls as possible solutions to overexploitation. In contrast, only
8% of Berrchid farmers and none from Chaouia mention such a demand
regulation policy (Faysse et al., 2011). Similarly, the 30 farmers questioned
on the three study sites in Algeria raised the relevance of increasing
resources, but none mentioned more stringent borehole control.  In
Nadhour in Tunisia, 15% of the 33 farmers questioned mention, among
the possible solutions to overexploitation, stricter control of illegal
boreholes. Thus, in some areas there is a willingness among farmers
to accept control mechanisms provided they are implemented fairly and
transparently.
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6. Wide Range of Instruments Implemented
and Envisaged
The different instruments used or envisaged to address unsustainableaquifer use may be grouped under three categories: those aimed
at increasing water resources, those aimed at reducing withdrawals,
and those aimed at compelling farmers not to increase withdrawals. 
6.1  Policies Aimed at Increasing Water Resources
Tunisia was the first country to implement supply-side management
policies to address aquifer overexploitation, that is by increasing available
water resources. In Algeria and Morocco, although policies aimed at
increasing water resources have long been pursued, they have only
very recently been specifically designed to address groundwater
overexploitation.
Aquifer Recharge and Establishment of Irrigation Areas using
Surface Water
Aquifer recharge initiatives have existed in Tunisia since 1992 and
represented 64 million m3 in 2006 for 21 aquifers according to the 2007
National State of the Environment Report. Water released from the
Nebhana dam onto the flood plains made it possible to recharge the
Kairouan aquifer. In the North, water from the Medjerda valley is
transferred to the coastal area of Ras El Jebel and injected into the
aquifer through about a dozen sites which are old quarries or wells. In
the latter case, while the recharge impact is highly visible in the infiltration
areas, the volumes injected (about 500,000 m3 yearly) are insufficient
to have an impact on the whole aquifer.  Recharge is also carried out
using treated waste water in the Korba region. In Algeria, recharge
basins have been used in the central area of Mitidja (see below). Lastly,
in Morocco wadi weirs have been built to encourage the infiltration of
flood waters into the Ghmat (in Haouz) and Souss wadis.
The other policy for increasing water resources is the design of irrigated
areas using surface water from a neighbouring basin. This is the case with
the above-mentioned Ras El Jebel scheme as well as several irrigated
areas in Cap Bon in Tunisia, where a network distributes water transferred
from the Medjerda wadi. In Morocco, the Guerdane irrigated area is supplied
from a dam upstream in the Souss basin. Other projects are also under
study in Morocco: an irrigated area on the Saïss plain from the Mdez dam
under construction, an irrigated area in coastal Chaouia using water from
the Oum Rbia, and in the longer-term, the transfer of water stored in the
North (mainly from the El Wahda dam) to central Morocco, which would
ensure the supply of drinking water as well as supply to new irrigated areas. 
Whether they concern aquifer recharge or the establishment of irrigated
areas by water transfer, these policies are implemented with difficulty
due to the fact that in an increasing number of watersheds, the main
surface water resources are already mobilized, leading to steadily
lower regulated volumes for future dams. Thus, although the project
for an irrigated area in the Chaouia zone supplied by water from the
Oum Rbia wadi has existed since the 1990s, this project has since
inception had to face the fact that the water from this wadi is already
over-allocated. 
Non-Traditional Water Resources
There are various projects underway for the creation of non-traditional
water resources, which should indirectly ease the pressure of agricultural
uses on groundwater. Thus, two irrigated areas will be created using
waste water from Berrchid and neighbouring Settat towns. In Algeria,
there is ongoing reflection on the systematic use of treated waste water
from the major towns and cities for irrigation.  The Tunisian administration
has long developed such use of treated waste water. There is no denying
that the results are mixed; farmers are reluctant since they cannot use
this water to grow high-value added market garden crops. The Tunisian
administration is currently conducting recharge programmes using
treated waste water. The other non-traditional resource is desalinated
sea-water.     In Algeria, over 20 such plants have been designed for
the main towns and cities. The objective is that, once these plants are
operational, dam water can be rechanneled to agriculture. In Souss, as
mentioned above, a 10,000 ha irrigated area using seawater is being
studied for the irrigation of market garden crops and citrus fruit exports. 
These supply-side approaches should provide a welcome breath of
fresh air. However, the volumes generated are often fairly low in relation
to ground water shortfalls. Among the cases studied, there is no example
where a supply-side policy sufficed on its own to restore a resource-
use balance, which is why it is important to combine such policies with
demand-side management approaches.
6.2  Demand-side Incentive Policies for Agricultural
Water
Support to Reconversion to Localized Irrigation
The main incentive policy is support to the reconversion of farms to
more efficient irrigation methods, in particular localized irrigation. This
is the flagship measure of national water saving programmes in the
three countries, with specific subsidization mechanisms. In Morocco,
subsidization rates have gradually increased, reaching 80% to 100%
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of the investment costs (with ceilings per item of equipment). In Algeria,
equipment was initially financed to the tune of 100% at the start of the
National Development Plan in 2000, but has since fallen back to about
50%. In Tunisia, subsidies are about 40% to 60% of the total investment
amount. However, dissemination of this innovation varies from region
to region.  While the equipment rate is high in Tunisia, it remains low in
many regions of Morocco and Algeria (only 40% in the Berrchid Plain
in Morocco). The main constraints include cumbersome administrative
procedures (Bekkar et al., 2007). Another constraint is that, in the three
countries, in order to submit the subsidy application form, it is necessary
to obtain groundwater abstraction authorization. Some actors, in
particular, the Chambers of Agriculture in Morocco, are asking to
discontinue this linkage. They argue that it is preferable that a farmer,
although irrigating without authorization, does so using localized rather
than gravity irrigation.
Such conversion will result in an efficiency gain at plot level of about
40%, even though this gain falls at watershed level, because part of the
gravity irrigation water percolates, replenishing the ground water aquifer.
Indeed, the main attraction of localized irrigation is the enhancement of
the water productivity due to a fall in labour costs and an increase in
yields. However, without technical support, localized irrigation
performance falls far short of the theoretical potential (Vidal et al., 2001).
In addition, when farmers shift from gravity to localized irrigation, there
is often an extension of the irrigated areas, related to a significant increase
in the productivity of the factors of production (capital, labour) rather
than a drop in pumped volumes (Bachta et al., 2004; Al Atiri, 2007).
The conversion to localized irrigation sometimes results in more intensive
agricultural activity and, ultimately, higher water consumption (Bouarfa,
2004; Molle et al., 2006). Thus, in coastal Chaouia, although the localized
irrigation equipment rate is about 90%, the aquifer remains highly
overexploited. Therefore, reconversion to localized irrigation remains
more of an instrument to support farmers in adapting to a water shortage
crisis (because the value-added is increased by m3) than as an
instrument to reduce abstraction. 
Individual Groundwater Withdrawal Fees
In theory, fees may both foster water-saving behaviour and finance
infrastructure development and agricultural support activities. Such fees
are provided for under Tunisian and Moroccan law (for example, in
Tunisia, they are two millimes per m3, i.e. about EUR 1 per 1000 m3
for groundwater) but are not applied. Attempts to introduce local fees
to finance operations for funding supply-side policies have also been
made, but with limited implementation to-date. In the Ras El Jbel region,
the administration has unsuccessfully tried to ensure that farmers who
benefit from groundwater recharge pay fees. In Souss, the framework
agreement made provision for farmers with over 15 hectares to finance
different activities defined in the agreement, but the current recovery
rate is low (about 15% in 2011).  In the study on the Massa Plain
Seawater Desalination Project, one option under discussion is the
equalization of fees: whatever water source (dam, groundwater or
desalination plant) farmers might use, they would pay the same price.
Similarly, in Tunisia, the administration is considering a trinomial fee in
the GDAs which would take into account GDA fixed and variable
operating costs and groundwater use. The administrations are trying
to find more efficient methods to obtain payment of these fees. In
Morocco, for instance, a 2010 Decree allows these fees charged by
the basin agencies to be considered as taxes. In Tunisia, their collection
through the electricity bill is being considered.
There are other incentive policies, although on a smaller scale. In Souss,
services of the Ministry of Agriculture disseminate climate data in order to
support farms (in practice the largest), with a view to enhancing irrigation
management.  Indeed, many studies conducted in Morocco show strong
water saving potential through better installations and enhanced
management of localized irrigation, which sometimes use double the
amount of water required (El Fanani, 2009). Lastly, other policies are
proposed by certain actors. Farmers in Nadhour propose to lower the
electricity night tariff to encourage farmers to irrigate during that period.
An insurance scheme has been proposed by Berrchid farmers: insurance
would be taken out for farmers who opt not to drill so that their rain fed
crop revenue (in particular from wheat) would be guaranteed even in the
event of a dry year.  In Souss, the basin agency has initiated a study on
water enhancement to be able to channel agricultural production over
time towards those crops that have the highest water productivity.
6.3.  Policies to Regulate Agricultural Water Demand
In the three countries under study, it would be extremely costly to control
the amounts abstracted from all the existing wells and boreholes.
Therefore, the administrations have tended to focus on control of new
drillings and the depth of the existing withdrawal points. This is easier
when the groundwater table is at a depth of over 70m, in which case
it is no longer possible for farmers to drill wells manually. They must
then use drilling machines – which makes control possible.
In Algeria, borehole control policies have been implemented since the
late 1980s, with in particular, a ban on new boreholes in Collective Farms
(EAC) which had been established after the break-up of self-managed
domains (large-scale public farms). In Tunisia, boreholes are banned
both in the protection and irrigated areas. In Morocco, the ban on
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borehole drilling is determined by the agencies for aquifers considered
as being overexploited. The forthcoming identification of protection
areas, in accordance with the provisions of the 1995 Act, should reinforce
the legality of such action. 
These borehole drilling bans are unevenly implemented. In Chaouia,
although boreholes are officially banned, there is no control in practice.
In the other cases studied in Morocco, there has been growing interest
in borehole control. In Souss, Saïss and the Berrchid Region, the
administrations are beginning to control borehole drilling, in particular
by impounding drilling machines. The Souss agency is also trying to
organize the drilling machine sector, especially through the establishment
of a professional association, which could become a management
interlocutor. In Algeria, some farmers have served prison sentences for
illegal drilling. In Tunisia, controls have been less stringent. Moreover,
since the events of January 2011, the public administrations have a
much weaker presence and fewer activities in rural areas. In the Nadhour
region, a local official estimated that, in the spring of 2011, 70 of the
existing 210 illegal boreholes had been drilled since January 2011. 
Implementation of borehole controls in some regions of the three
countries has helped to hold back farmers in their rush to drill. However,
there is still a largely unresolved issue of how to ensure the fair and
transparent implementation of such controls. Farmers do not have the
same resources to be able to bypass the regulations; the strengthening
of water policing, if not specifically backed by a policy  specific for small-
scale farms, could create even greater widening of the gap between
farms in a position to drill and those compelled to adopt adaptive
strategies. Lastly, control of abstracted volumes through electricity
consumption is envisaged in Tunisia, but not yet implemented.
In Morocco, in Saïss, Souss and the Berrchid Region, the basin
agencies have adopted a common method for obtaining the
registration of existing boreholes. Farmers are invited to declare their
borehole over a given period, during which registration applications
will be subject to a field investigation and, in general, approved. Then,
at the end of the period, the agency will declare the final suspension
of withdrawal permits. Such a regularization period is being carried
out in 2011 and will be completed in February 2012 in the cases
studied in Morocco. In the past, farmers have remained cautious
regarding this type of initiative, and only declared the borehole if they
needed a deepening authorization or a subsidy for localized irrigation.
However, the threat by a basin agency to close illegal boreholes could
become more credible since applications for legalization in the Berrchid
Region concerned about half the agency’s estimated number of
boreholes in April 2011.
Table 2 presents the expected impacts of the different instruments
discussed (increased supply, incentives and control), in respect of three
criteria: increase in water resources, expected impact on groundwater
withdrawals and water productivity. There appears to be no single
instrument capable of being employed to simultaneously improve water
productivity and reduce groundwater withdrawals. Furthermore, these
instruments also differ in terms of the speed with which they can be
implemented: subsidies and even regulation policies may be
implemented within a much shorter timeframe than the reconversion of
part of the local economy to non-agricultural activities. This demonstrates
the need to combine approaches to limit groundwater withdrawal
increases while maintaining farmers’ income. It is, in fact, a series of
combined control and support actions that underpin the Souss
Framework Agreement.
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7. Possible Approaches to an Agricultural
Economy Based on Sustainable Groundwater
Use that Takes into Consideration the
Diversity of Farms 
The foregoing analysis shows that public policies and coordinationmechanisms have been initiated, and are evidence of the growing
interest in the issue of groundwater overexploitation, even though such
initiatives have for the moment not yet restored the resource-user balance
in the aquifers studied. In any event, these promising initiatives show
the relevance of an integrative approach, which, on the one hand,
combines control and support actions and, on the other, is accepted
by coalitions of local actors.
7.1  Use a Wider Range of Instruments and Monitor
their Impacts
Efficiency and Equity of Control Instruments Used
Control of well and borehole drilling often appears as a necessary
measure to ensure sustainable aquifer use. Unlike other cases
described, for example in India (Shah, 2009), the main constraint to
the implementation of such control is not its cost, given the fairly
strong presence of local authorities in rural areas. It will depend, above
all, on the strong determination and close involvement of the local
authorities. Indeed, these authorities often have the impression of
having to choose between short-term social peace and the less visible
medium-term viability of the agriculture-aquifer system.
Moreover, there is the issue of equity, since farmers do not have the
same resources to bypass the existing institutional control mechanisms.
Thus, 70% of farmers questioned on the three study sites in Algeria
underscored the importance of having networks to obtain drilling rights.
Lastly, in Tunisia, the issue of a legitimate authority to carry out this
control has arisen since the events of January 2011.  In Tunisia and
Algeria, due to the large number of boreholes connected to the power
grid, it is possible to control water use through electricity consumption
as is the case in India.
To address this problem of implementation and equity, one solution
being prepared by the administration in Tunisia is to entrust small
aquifer borehole control to farmers’ associations.  The outcomes of
Table 2: Expected Impacts of the Different Instruments Implemented and Considered
Type of Policy Instruments
Expected Impacts
ImplementationIncrease in Water
Resources
Reduction in  Aquifer
Withdrawals
Increased Water 
Productivity
Policies for 
Increasing 
Water 
Resources
Aquifer Recharge Yes No No
Ras Jebel, Central
Mitidja, Souss
Irrigated area using surface
water or brought from other
areaswaste water, seawater
desalination
Yes Incentive No
Guerdane (Souss), 
Ras Jebel
Incentive 
Policies for 
Demand 
Management
Support reconversion to 
localized irrigation
No
Positive or negative 
impact
Strong impact All areas
Assistance  for improved 
irrigation practices 
No No direct impact Strong impact Souss 
Tariffs No Weak impact No Souss
Support conversion to
crops  enabling high water
productivity 
No
Positive or negative
impact
Strong impact Discussed in Souss
Insurance mechanisms,
non-agricultural employment
No Incentive No
Discussed but not
planned
Demand 
Control Policies
Control of new boreholes
and of the deepening of
existing boreholes
No Positive impact No impact In theory in all areas
Registration of existing 
wells and boreholes
No
Improve control 
implementation
No impact Souss, Saïss, Berrchid
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similar experiences at the international level using such an approach
are not unequivocal. In Mexico, this approach has until now been
considered a failure (Wester et al., 2009). In Spain, it only worked
where water user associations emerged from projects developed by
the farmers and not where they were set up by the administration
(Rica et al., 2011). Moreover, in France, while farmers sometimes
acknowledge the relevance of borehole control, they do not often
want to directly control groundwater use and prefer to entrust
responsibility for it to the State (discussions in Beauce and on the
Roussillon case, Rinaudo et al., 2011). While the possibility of self-
regulation seems possible in areas of limited size due to the fact that
farmers know one another, it does not seem relevant for large aquifers
such as the one in Sissseb El Alem. However, in the case of such
large aquifers, the provision of maps indicating the positions of
regularized wells and boreholes could enable farmers, without carrying
out the control themselves, to at least control the fair and transparent
implementation of water policing.
Towards a Broader, More Integrated Range of Mobilizable
Instruments
All the measures to enhance water productivity at the individual
(improved market access, higher yields, etc.) and collective (improved
functioning of GDAs, etc.) levels will help to improve the adaptive
capacity of farms. However, in the absence of control action, such
policies could contribute to the maintenance of strong pressure on
water resources. It would, for instance, be possible to support
cauliflower or artichoke production in the Chaouia coastal area
because these plants are salt-resistant. However, such support could
lead to the maintenance of a situation where withdrawals remain
much higher than the groundwater recharge. Such support would
then be usefully combined with measures to limit withdrawal increases.
Different actions have already been identified as potentially interesting,
but have to-date been little explored. Therefore, it will be useful to
identify crops and sectors that will allow increased water productivity
in order to design policies focused on the redirection of part of the
farms towards these types of crops. Such policies would be based
on incentives, since: the administrations do not have direct control
over crops produced using groundwater, and none of the government
services contacted has expressed any desire to carry out any control
of agricultural produce. Similarly, local development opportunities
fostering non-agricultural employment (rural tourism and industry)
could be more closely incorporated into local discussions.
7.2 Catalyze Local and National-Level Coalition
Building in order to Design, Coordinate and Implement
Policies.
There is an ongoing reflection at national level in each of the three
countries in a bid to establish connections between agricultural policy
and water policy, taking into consideration issues such as food security
or water resource accounting, including virtual water embedded in
imports of agricultural products (Chahed et al., 2007). These studies
deserve to be discussed among the ministries concerned to define
more closely integrated public policies. At the same time, it would appear
important to pursue the local testing of new approaches.
Relevance of Coalitions
The building of coalitions of actors capable of working together (Mollinga
et al., 2007) seems to be an important stage in the design and
implementation of policies to address unsustainable groundwater use
for several reasons: (i) no instruments have emerged that are universally
valid, but it seems more relevant to design series of locally coordinated
instruments; (ii) some instruments make it necessary to think at the local
development level, and not merely within a framework confined to
agriculture and water resources; (iii) enough actors have to be gathered
to ensure that the choices can be implemented. In many cases, such
as those of coastal Chaouia or the Saïss aquifer, existing coalitions do
not involve enough actors, and do not succeed in defining and
implementing a strategy that would ensure the sustainability of the
aquifers and the crops that depend on them. 
Such coalitions could include the administrations responsible for
agriculture and water resources, but also and especially the farmers
who locally are willing to make proposals so that their activities can be
sustained in their region. Experiences in Berrchid and in Chaouia (Faysse
et al., submitted) show that farmers can be interested in participating
in the design of management instruments.  
These coalitions may also include the local communities (cf. the pivotal
role of the Souss-Massa Regional Council), in order to consider possible
solutions at local territory level, such as the creation of non-agricultural
employment. The local entities of the Ministry of Interior could also play
a role in this, with a view to providing local backing to water policing,
especially in Morocco. These coalitions could be broader-based as
shown by the relevance of involving the Power Generation and
Distribution Utility (STEG) in Tunisia in linking electrification to borehole
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drilling permits, and possibly the establishment of new types of tariffs
and quotas.
Opportunities for Supporting Coalition Building
Coalition building is not an easy matter and could be supported in
several ways.  First, an actor may support the formation of these
coalitions. In Morocco, the basin agencies are responsible for
groundwater contract design, which provides a coalition building
opportunity. This is what was proposed by the Bouregreg Chaouia
Agency, which in the spring of 2011 took the initiative to hold meetings
with the Governorates and courts to explain the importance of the
overexploitation challenge and to ask these actors to implement
borehole control or support the design of irrigated areas using treated
waste water. However, in general, Morocco’s basin agencies lack
human resources to coordinate such activities.  Moreover, since basin
agencies are responsible for protecting water resources, this could
affect their capacity to be recognized as a lead ntity in the debate (in
France, local structures – for instance “Syndicats de pays”, i.e.,
(communal planning associations, are sometimes given this role).  
Secondly, it is often claimed that it is necessary to raise farmers’
awareness on the issue of groundwater overexploitation. Although such
a task is useful, especially in the acquisition by farmers of knowledge
on the functioning of aquifers, sensitization to the problem and
mainstreaming it into the debate must also involve the other organizations
concerned such as government services, local communities, or public
companies, e.g. power utilities.
Thirdly, there are few professional organizations especially for
groundwater users (the Tunisian GDAs and Sousse Agricultural Water
User Associations operating with boreholes could be considered as
such associations). However, particularly in the regions of Berrchid
or coastal Chaouia, there are no professional organizations maintaining
strong ties with farmers using groundwater.  In such cases, it will be
necessary to identify other mechanisms to ensure farmer participation,
for example through the existing professional organizations, even
though they have no official water management responsibility.
Moreover, in Berrchid, 42% of the land is farmed by tenants who
attach considerably less importance to the sustainable use of the
land they occupy. Therefore, it will be useful to develop specific
approaches to involve owners in the discussions.  Moreover, large
farms often have more capacity than smaller ones to participate in
coalitions of actors, in order to bypass the implementation of water
access control mechanisms and to benefit from incentive instruments
(e.g. conversion to localized irrigation). It is of particular interest to
ensure that the discussions include these small farms.
Fourthly, the diversity of the initiatives taken in the Maghreb countries,
but also at the international level, shows the importance of exchanges
on these experiences. Such exchanges will be more fruitful if organized
around concrete local initiatives rather than being confined to the
legal aspects, and if they are open to countries with similar institutional
and farm characteristics such as India and Mexico.
Lastly, it would be useful to have a formal, national framework 
for structuring and ensuring government recognition of possible
agreements concluded at local level (in line with the approach
recommended by Ostrom, 1990. The groundwater contract, as currently
envisaged in Morocco, could provide an opportunity for such recognition
of the initiative capacity of local actors, provided it is the outcome of
joint drafting by all the actors.
Acquire the Necessary Knowledge to Understand the Ongoing
Dynamics and Analyze Available Options
As mentioned in the introduction, until now, groundwater use has mostly
been a silent revolution. In order to understand the ongoing local level
dynamics, it would be necessary to examine past and current
development of the territories where this intensive use of groundwater
has emerged, in hydrological, social and economic terms. It would be
useful to estimate the size of this groundwater use-based economy,
especially to estimate the costs of the overexploitation and no
management scenario, but also to compare such an estimate with the
costs of possible management options. 
Moreover, at both the national and local levels, administrations are
moving forward with both supply and demand-side policies without
having formally defined what relative weight to assign to these two types
of policies. To our knowledge, there is still no estimate on a given case
study in the Maghreb, of the anticipated costs and impacts of the different
instruments envisaged in terms, for example, of resource use, water
productivity and the impact on farm dynamics.  Therefore, it would be
useful to accompany the discussions on the proposed options - from
the construction of a framework for mutual understanding and diagnosis
among actors, up to the assessment of the costs and impacts of the
different options under consideration, particularly in different existing
types of farms. 
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8.  Conclusion 
Despite the urbanization of Maghreb societies, the rural areas willremain of critical importance in the years ahead. The numbers of
rural dwellers in the three countries studied should remain stable until
2020 (Abis, 2007). Moreover, the agricultural sector remains one of the
mainstays of the Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian economies with
respective agricultural GDPs of 18%, 11% and 13% (Hervieu et al.,
2006). As elsewhere in the world, this agricultural sector has assumed
increasing importance in public policies. Morocco, for example, has
designed a large-scale plan for agriculture with its Green Morocco Plan. 
Groundwater exploitation has been one of the key drivers of agricultural
growth in North Africa over the past few decades, following a phase of
public investment in irrigated networks using surface water.  However,
this use has also become the main risk of unsustainable water uses for
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and one of the main frailties of the
agricultural economies of these countries. 
The three Maghreb countries have historically developed different
strategies for addressing groundwater overexploitation. Thus, in Morocco
and Tunisia, the option initially selected was to mobilize water resources
and, more recently, to try to control irrigation water demand, especially
in Morocco, through a determination to more actively enforce such
control as provided for by law. In Algeria, on the other hand, a control
policy has existed since the 1980s but it was only in the 2000 decade
that the government began to attach more importance to a policy to
increase water resources.
Overall, the policies implemented were sectoral, uncoordinated and did
not collectively grasp the different risks related to unsustainable
groundwater use in a given territory. This lack of a holistic vision reflects
the absence at international level of donor-validated models to address
decreasing groundwater levels, in situations where users are informal
and water resource management systems have limited resources
(Mukherji et Shah, 2005).
More recently, different initiatives have emerged, both in a bid to find
innovative ways of mobilizing new water resources, but also by
involving the different actors in the design of packages combining
resource creation and use control instruments. In such a context
where it is inconceivable in the short-term to envisage a management
mechanism like the one used in Beauce (with the installation of meters
and quotas for each farmer), different approaches have been tested.
These experiences have often been replicated at the local and territorial
levels of the aquifer. 
Though several of the initiatives appear promising, to-date none of them
has led to the restoration of the resource-use balance. In order to achieve
the dual objective of an agricultural activity and the sustainable use of
groundwater resources, the analysis presented here argues the need
to combine different instruments. This constraint is also an opportunity,
because such combinations of instruments will be far more acceptable
to farmers than instruments that are solely focused on groundwater
protection. Consensus could be reached among the different actors on
this type of combination, which could be both the purpose and grounds
for the establishment of local communities of actors that could take the
initiative to develop such instruments towards achieving sustainable
management of the agriculture-aquifer-soil system.
Building these coalitions could be the subject of support, as could
their necessary reflection on possible options for supporting an
agricultural economy based on sustainable aquifer use. Groundwater
management requires the design of innovative territorial policies
regarding both the instruments to be used and the manner in which
they are developed and used. 
Many overexploited natural resources in the Maghreb share similar
characteristics to those of groundwater, for instance the difficulty of
individually controlling the withdrawals of many informal users, the
complex dynamics of these natural resources and the limited means
of public organizations responsible for managing such resources. For
example, this is the case for forests and steppe areas used for livestock
grazing. The main management principles presented in this study,
such as the opportunity to combine approaches, or build coalitions
for reflection and management that encompass actors beyond the
agriculture-natural resource tandem, will also be major factors for
reflection on how to obtain the means of effective governance,
combining local and national levels of these other natural resources.
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